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I. INTRODUCTION
A decade ago, law enforcement in two Minnesota counties,
Hennepin and Ramsey, explored the potential benefits of a
"double-blind sequential" lineup recommended by eyewitness
f Nancy K. Steblay, PhD, is a Professor of Psychology at Augsburg College,
Minneapolis, Minnesota. Contact: steblay@augsburg.edu.
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scientists. The double-blind sequential procedure is a strategy to
improve the quality of eyewitness identification evidence based on
2scientific investigation of eyewitness decisions. In these two
counties, pilot studies were conducted to determine the
practicability of the procedure, and by 2006, double-blind
sequential lineups had been implemented as a best practice for
eyewitness identification evidence.' These Minnesota law
enforcement agencies built upon the scientific data by
demonstrating that double-blind sequential procedure works in
practice.'
The uncertain reliability of eyewitness identification evidence
has been highlighted in recent state and United States Supreme
Court decisions, underscored by numerous cases of wrongful
conviction, and placed at the center of policy and procedural
changes across the nation for collection of eyewitness evidence by
law enforcement. 5 Most recently, the National Academy of Sciences
undertook a lengthy review of the research literature and provided
resounding support for eyewitness science, recommending changes
in police and legal practice to accommodate settled eyewitness
science principles.'
The strong rationale for changes in how eyewitness evidence is
collected and used in legal proceedings is founded on sound
eyewitness science.' This begs the question: What are the scientific
findings? This article will provide an update regarding the status of
1. See Susan Gaertner & John Harrington, Successful Eyewitness Identification
Reform: Ramsey County's Blind Sequential Lineup Protocol, POLICE CHIEF, Apr. 2009,
available at http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction
=display-arch&articleid=1776&issue-id=42009.
2. See generally Nancy K Steblay, Jennifer E. Dysart & Gary L. Wells, Seventy-
Two Tests of the Sequential Lineup Superiority Effect: A Meta-Analysis and Policy
Discussion, 17 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 99 (2011) (reporting results of a
simultaneous versus sequential lineup study).
3. See Gaertner & Harrington, supra note 1; Amy Klobuchar, Nancy K.
Steblay & Hilary L. Caligiuri, Improving Eyewitness Identifications: Hennepin County's
Blind Sequential Lineup Pilot Project, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICSJ. 381,404-05
(2006).
4. See Klobuchar, Steblay & Caligiuri, supra note 3, at 404-05.
5. See infta Part II.
6. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L AcADs., IDENTIFYING THE
CULPRIT: ASSESSING EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION (forthcoming Apr. 2015), available
at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record-id=18891.
7. Id. (manuscript at 1).
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eyewitness research" and place the findings of the past forty years
within the context of legal decision making and law enforcement
practice. 9 This information is directly relevant not only to law
enforcement but to attorneys, judges, and policymakers.' ° The
purpose is to inform legal professionals about the valuable
contributions of eyewitness science to the endeavors of the justice
system and to describe improvements for the ways in which
eyewitness evidence is collected and preserved.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Eyewitness identification is persuasive evidence of criminal
wrongdoing." On the witness stand, a confident and consistent
eyewitness is likely to deliver compelling testimony that is very
believable to a jury.12 However, memory is fallible and even a well-
intentioned and confident eyewitness may bring flawed recall to a
police lineup and falsely incriminating evidence to court.
Historically, courts have recognized eyewitness identification
evidence as problematic even as juries continued to find eyewitness
testimony convincing.
In the 1960s, the United States Supreme Court instituted
safeguards to protect criminal defendants from wrongful
convictions as a result of misidentification. For example, in United
States v. Wade, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel applies to critical stages of pretrial proceedings including
the physical lineup procedure. The Court recognized "[t]he
vagaries of eyewitness identification" and the "innumerable dangers
and variable factors which might seriously, even crucially, derogate
from a fair trial."' 5 The United States Supreme Court ruled in
Stovall v. Denno that an unduly suggestive lineup constitutes a due
process violation if it could lead to an irreparably mistaken
8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Part V.
10. See infra Parts V-VI.
11. See generally Gary L. Wells, Amina Memon & Steven D. Penrod, Eyewitness
Evidence: Improving Its Probative Value, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 45 (2006)
(discussing the importance of eyewitness identification in the criminal justice
system).
12. Id. at 65.
13. Id. at 51-54.
14. 388 U.S. 218, 236-39 (1967).
15. Id. at 228.
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identification. 6 Therefore, a defendant could move to suppress
prejudicial identification testimony depending on the "totality of
the circumstances" surrounding the testimony." The next year, in
Simmons v. United States, the Court ruled that each potential due
process violation during a lineup must be examined on the facts of
the individual case." Lineups would be excluded from trial if the
"procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.'
19
In the 1970s, the Court began retreating from the broader
safeguards guaranteed in Wade, Stovall, and Simmons. In United
States v. Ash, the Court refused to extend the protection of a Sixth
Amendment right to counsel to photographic lineups, reasoning
that a photo display did not involve such risk so as to require a
safeguard." The Court also found that even extremely biased
lineups were not per se exclusionary.22 Instead, it was necessary to
determine whether an admittedly suggestive lineup was
nonetheless reliable.2"
Neil v. Biggers established five factors for determining the
trustworthiness of an eyewitness identification: the witness's
opportunity to view the perpetrator during the crime, the witness's
attention to the perpetrator at the time of the crime, the accuracy
of the witness's initial description of the perpetrator, the witness's
certainty at the lineup, "and the length of time between the crime
and the [identification] . In Manson v. Brathwaite, the Court
concluded "that reliability is the linchpin in determining the
admissibility of identification testimony., 25 This decision firmly
emphasized that the important question was not whether the
identification procedure was prejudicial to the criminal defendant,
but whether the identification itself was reliable 6
With Manson, the Supreme Court mapped out a two-pronged
decision process along with the criteria believed useful for
16. 388 U.S. 293, 301-02 (1967).
17. Id. at 302.
18. 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968).
19. Id.
20. See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
21. Id. at 321.
22. Id. at 325.
23. See id.
24. 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972).
25. 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977).
26. See id. at 98-99.
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evaluating eyewitness identification evidence. 27 The Court directed
that if the identification was achieved under use of suggestive
procedures (Prong 1), then the reliability of the evidence is to be
evaluated (Prong 2) using the Biggers criteria. 28 The validity of these
criteria has been challenged in recent years in the scientific
literature discussed below.
j
The United States Supreme Court recently reviewed an
eyewitness case for the first time since 1977.0 The Manson standard
was left undisturbed by the Court's decision, as was the two-
pronged decision process for evaluation of eyewitness evidence
reliability.3' While commending the science that clearly
demonstrated the frequent lack of reliability in eyewitness memory,
the Court reiterated that court consideration of eyewitness
identification reliability is not afforded to defendants automatically,
but only if the state conducted a suggestive identification
procedure. 32
Two recent state court cases, however, have reshaped the legal
architecture for identification evidence in those states. The New
Jersey Supreme Court appointed a Special Master (Retired Judge
Geoffrey Gaulkin), who reviewed the science on eyewitness
memory in an eighty-eight-page document,33 concluding that "the
soundness and reliability of that evidence is indisputable."34
Eyewitness identification has also been described as "the gold
standard in terms of the applicability of social science research to
the law."
35
27. Id. at 110.
28. Id. at 110, 114.
29. See infra Part V.
30. Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012); see also Robyn Hagan
Cain, Eyewitness Identification Review: 2011 Supreme Court Cases, FINDLAw (Aug. 24,
2011, 9:01 AM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/supreme-court/2011/08/eyewitness
-identification-review-201 1-supreme-court-cases.html (stating that "[t]he last
Supreme Court eyewitness case was decided in 1977").
31. See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 718-20.
32. Id. at 718.
33. Press Release, Geoffrey Gaulkin, Special Master, Report of the Special
Master on New Jersey v. Henderson (June 18, 2010), http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us
/pressrel/HENDERSON%20FINAL%20BRIEF%20.PDF%20(00621142) .PDF.
34. Id. at 72.
35. State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 916 (N.J. 2011) (noting that this view
was from expert testimony offered by the defense on remand).
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The New Jersey Supreme Court issued its opinion in State v.
Henderson:
We find that the scientific evidence considered at the
remand hearing is reliable. That evidence offers
convincing proof that the current test for evaluating the
trustworthiness of eyewitness identifications should be
revised. Study after study revealed a troubling lack of
reliability in eyewitness identifications. From social
science research to the review of actual police lineups,
from laboratory experiments to DNA exonerations, the
record proves that the possibility of mistaken
identification is real. Indeed, it is now widely known that
eyewitness misidentification is the leading cause of
wrongful convictions across the country.
In the end, we conclude that the current standard for
assessing eyewitness identification evidence does not fully
meet its goals. It does not offer an adequate measure for
reliability or sufficiently deter inappropriate police
conduct. It also overstates the jury's inherent ability to
evaluate evidence offered by eyewitnesses who honestly
believe their testimony is accurate."
The New Jersey Supreme Court defined two principle steps as
a corrective strategy. First, when a defendant can show evidence of
suggestiveness in the identification procedure, a thorough pretrial
inquiry will determine if the eyewitness evidence is admissible. 7
Second, the court system is charged to develop enhanced jul7
instructions on eyewitness identification for trial judges to employ.
The Oregon Supreme Court in State v. Lawson more directly
met the onus of scientific memory research by placing eyewitness
evidence squarely within the dictates of the state's evidentiary
guidelines.3 That is, the party that proffers eyewitness testimony at
trial must bear the burden of demonstrating the reliability of that
evidence, regardless of whether it was obtained through suggestive
or non-suggestive police actions."' The focus is on the
36. Id. at 877-78.
37. Id. at 919.
38. Id.; see also Press Release, Geoffrey Gaulkin, supra note 33, at 74-75.
39. 291 P.3d 673 (Or. 2012).
40. Id. at 685.
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trustworthiness of the evidence, and the validity of that evidence
lies in the personal knowledge of the witness, untainted by external
influences or information. Therefore, the judge is required to
determine whether the evidence had its source in the personal
knowledge of the witness or from outside contaminating
information.42 According to Boston attorney James Doyle: "Perhaps
most importantly, the Oregon Supreme Court emphasized that
whether or not anyone has committed misconduct, judges are
required to carefully balance the probative value of eyewitness
evidence against that evidence's prejudicial effect in light of the
findings of modern psychology."43 In ruling so, the court relied heavily
on the scientific knowledge that has emerged in recent decades.44
III. THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THREE CORE QUESTIONS
Eyewitness scientists have focused their investigations on three
core concerns that have both theoretical and practical relevance:
(1) How reliable are eyewitnesses? (2) Why do eyewitnesses make
errors? (3) Can these errors be prevented? These three questions
will be addressed in the sections below. First, however, it is useful to
define the methods through which scientific knowledge about
eyewitness memory is obtained.
A. The Nature of the Scientific Evidence
Scientists for four decades have developed and reported
empirical findings that shed light on how mistaken identifications
happen and why eyewitnesses can become so confident even in
wrong identifications.45 As noted in the Henderson decision,
scientific knowledge about eyewitness memory comes from
multiple sources.6  First, eyewitness researchers explore the
complex phenomenon of eyewitness identification decisions as
other scientists do in their own domains-by taking the
phenomenon apart in the laboratory in order to understand its
41. Id. at 699.
42. Id. at 692.
43. James M. Doyle, Oregon's Eyewitness Decision: Back to Basics, CRIME REP.
(Dec. 13, 2012, 10:52:37 AM) (emphasis added), http://www.thecrimereport.org
/viewpoints/2012-12-oregons-eyewitness-decision-back-to-basics.
44. Lawson, 291 P.3d at 690.
45. See, e.g., Wells, Memon & Penrod, supra note 11.
46. State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 892-910 (NJ. 2011).
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underlying components and the cause-and-effect relationships
among these components." Hundreds of controlled laboratory
experiments have provided understanding of how various factors
enhance or inhibit eyewitness decision accuracy." These factors
encompass not only issues of memory strength but also social and
motivational influences on eyewitness decisions.49
Laboratory experiments possess the crucial attribute of
"ground truth" that rarely exists in field tests with real cases:
absolute knowledge regarding the certain identity of the culprit.5°
Lab scientists create artificial crime events through staged video or
live enactments so they can subsequently compare eyewitness
responses to a culprit-present lineup (the culprit is in the lineup)
versus a culprit-absent lineup (the culprit has been replaced by an
innocent "filler")."M This aspect of lab research establishes a lineup
procedure's capacity to reduce misidentifications (in culprit-absent
lineups) and its concomitant impacts on correct decisions in
culprit-present lineups. The best identification procedure is one
that can maintain legitimate correct identifications of the culprit
51while tamping down identification errors.
Replication of experimental results is a basic requirement of
good science. Research teams in different labs will test the same
hypothesis with somewhat differing stimulus materials (crime
events and lineups), participant-subjects, and strategies. If many
studies across time converge on a common outcome and
psychological principle, confidence in that research finding will
grow, especially if the studies are peer-reviewed and published in
reputable science journals.5' For legal professionals and many
others, however, one of the difficulties in understanding a new,
47. Id. at 892 ("[M]ost eyewitness identification research is conducted
through controlled lab experiments. Unlike analyses of real-world data,
experimental studies allow researchers to control and isolate variables. If an
experiment is designed well, scientists can then draw relevant conclusions from
different conditions."); see also Wells, Memon & Penrod, supra note 11, at 49.
48. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 893.
49. Id. at 894.
50. Wells, Memon & Penrod, supra note 11, at 49.
51. Id. at 50.
52. Gary L. Wells, Nancy K. Steblay & Jennifer E. Dysart, Eyewitness
Identification Reforms: Are Suggestiveness-Induced Hits and Guesses True Hits?, 7 PERSP.
ON PSYCHOL. Sci. 264, 265 (2012).
53. See generally Henderson, 27 A.3d at 892-93 (discussing the
authoritativeness of peer-reviewed research).
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large, and unfamiliar body of science is that it is so difficult to read
and make sense of so many individual studies. Fortunately,
eyewitness researchers have recognized the usefulness of a cohesive
data review, and they make frequent use of the statistical review
technique called meta-analysis. 4 A meta-analysis pulls together all
available research on a topic, combines the data from the empirical
studies across laboratories, and provides an overall statistical
summary of the results.5 The meta-analysis directly answers the
question of interest: What is the status of this hypothesis when all
the studies are combined?
Most usefully, meta-analysis allows detection of reliable
56patterns of outcomes that occur across studies. The analysis
furthermore informs us about circumstances that produce a
nonconforming outcome.5 ' For example, studies have consistently
found that older adults (sixty years plus) produce more
identification errors than do younger adults (eighteen to thirty
years), as can be seen in many studies. Attention can be drawn to
one study with an unusual outcome among the extant literature.
This single study produced no difference in accuracy between the
older and younger age groups. Closer examination revealed that
the "older adults" tested were in fact thirty-five to fifty-five years
old.59 The reliable pattern of older eyewitness identification errors
that turns up across most studies is thus not negated by this one
54. See generally Robert Rosenthal, Meta-Analytic Procedures for Social Research, in
6 APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH METHOD SERIES (Leonard Bickman & Debra J. Rog
eds., 1991) (discussing the evolution of meta-analysis procedures).
55. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Meta-Analysis: A Primer for Legal Scholars, 80 TEMP.
L. REv. 201, 201 (2007).
56. Id. at 201-02.
57. See id.
58. E.g., Amina Memon, Lorraine Hope & Ray Bull, Exposure Duration: Effects
on Eyewitness Accuracy and Confidence, 94 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 339 (2003); Forrest
Scogin, Sharon K. Calhoon & Michael D'Errico, Eyewitness Confidence and Accuracy
Among Three Age Cohorts, 13 J. APPLIED GERONTOLOGY 172 (1994); Jean H. Searcy,
James C. Bartlett & Amina Memon, Age Differences in Accuracy and Choosing in
Eyewitness Identification and Face Recognition, 27 MEMORY & COGNITION 538 (1999);
Rachel Wilcock & Ray Bull, Novel Lineup Methods for Improving the Performance of
Older Eyewitnesses, 24 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 718 (2010). The author is
currently preparing a meta-analytic review of the available research on the topic of
older versus younger adult lineup identification performance.
59. See Daniel B. Wright & Joanne N. Stroud, Age Differences in Lineup
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"no-difference" finding. Instead, we now know more about the age
at which deficits occur (beyond thirty-five to fifty) and that this mid-
age group performs as well as the eighteen to thirty group. 6°
An important point here is that meta-analyses are likely to
uncover some "non-effects"-that is, a few studies may fail to
produce the typical outcomes. Often the failure of a study to
replicate the wider body of research is explicable upon further
examination. It is also true that simply by chance some studies will
produce odd outcomes, what scientists call "noise" in the data. The
value of scientific meta-analysis, for researchers and for the legal
system, is to delineate enduring patterns in the data and not place
undue confidence in the odd outcome. Simply put, the smart
money is on the pattern, not the noise. Meta-analyses are
particularly helpful for expert witnesses and attorneys who wish to•61
clearly summarize the hterature.
Once principles of memory are established in the lab, it is
useful to move to the field for subsequent testing with real
eyewitnesses to crimes in real investigations. Recently, the best
lineup practices recommended by eyewitness scientists were put to
the test in four U.S. cities-Austin (Texas), Charlotte-Mecklenburg,
San Diego, and Tucson." The outcomes of this large field
experiment were consistent with the decades of laboratory research
outcomes and provided confidence in the benefits of the
recommended double-blind sequential lineup procedure to reduce
misidentifications.
A final source of information is archival studies of existing data
from police jurisdictions or legal cases. The best-documented legal
cases are those of the Innocence Project." In addition, ten
60. See generally id. (finding no difference between the two age groups
studied).
61. See Blumenthal, supra note 55, at 206-07.
62. See GARY L. WELLS, NANCY K. STEBLAY & JENNIFER E. DYSART, AM.
JUDICATURE Soc'y, A TEST OF THE SIMULTANEOUS VS. SEQUENTIAL LINEUP METHODS:
AN INITIAL REPORT OF THE AJS NATIONAL EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION FIELD STUDIES,
at ix (2011); see also Gary L. Wells, Nancy K. Steblay & Jennifer E. Dysart, Double-
Blind Photo Lineups Using Actual Eyewitnesses: An Experimental Test of a Sequential
Versus Simultaneous Lineup Procedure, 39 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 13 (2015).
63. The Innocence Project is a "public policy organization dedicated to
exonerating wrongfully convicted individuals through DNA testing and reforming
the criminal justice system to prevent future injustice." INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited Nov. 14, 2014); see also BRANDON L.
GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS Go WRONG
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published archival police datasets are available (including the
Hennepin County study discussed above).64 One of the most
intriguing aspects of the archival data is the consistent level of
errors made by these real witnesses. Of witnesses who made a
positive identification of a lineup member, one-third chose a
filler-a known error. 5 This is probably an underestimate, given
that police often do not document filler picks, instead recording
them as non-identifications. This level of error validates the
concerns of research scientists that eyewitnesses too frequently base
lineup decisions on a weak and unreliable memory.
B. How Reliable Are Eyewitnesses? Eyewitness Errors and Wrongful
Conviction
The Innocence Project recently reported the exoneration of
Nathan Brown, who served seventeen years in a Louisiana prison
for robbery and attempted rape before being exonerated by DNA
evidence in 2014.67 The conviction was based largely on mistaken
identification by the victim initially during a one-on-one show-up
61identification procedure and subsequently in court.
The negative ramifications of wrongful conviction extend
beyond the horrific effects on the lives of the violated innocent
person and his or her loved ones. Investigators, attorneys, and
testifying witnesses who have helped to prosecute a later
exonerated individual are likely shaken with the realization that
even well-intentioned "by the book" procedures can end very
233, 285-87 (2011) (discussing the Innocence Project).
64. See Klobuchar, Steblay & Caligiuri, supra note 3, at 381.
65. Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification: Probative Value, Criterion Shifts, and
Policy Regarding the Sequential Lineup, 23 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 11, 13
(2014).
66. See id.; see also POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, A NATIONAL SURVEY OF
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES IN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, at xi
(2013), available at http://www.policeforum.org/ (scroll over "Publications" drop-
down menu; follow "Free Online Documents" menu option; follow hyperlink with
source title).
67. Louisiana Man Is Freed from Prison After DNA Results Prove His Innocence in
Attempted Rape Conviction, INNOCENCE PROJECT (June 25, 2014, 2:35 PM), http://
www.innocenceproject.org/Content/LouisianaMan-isFreedfrom_Prisonafter
_DNAResultsProveHis Innocence inAttemptedRapeConviction.php.
68. Nathan Brown, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org
/Content/NathanBrown.php (last visited Nov. 14, 2014).
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badly.69 Wrongful convictions can erode public confidence in the
justice system and citizens' sense of security. Importantly, a
wrongful conviction consists of two errors: an innocent person is
convicted and the true perpetrator is left on the streets to commit
additional offenses.70
The introduction of DNA testing in the early 1990s generated
objective evidence of wrongful conviction and, to date, the
Innocence Project has documented over 300 wrongful
convictions." The greater availability of DNA in rape cases
compared to other crimes likely explains the preponderance of
72rape cases among DNA exonerations. Hence, it can be argued
that cases in which false convictions are exposed by DNA are the11• 73
"tip of [the] iceberg" in miscarriages ofjustice. There are likely to
be large numbers of undetected wrongful convictions in rape cases
without testable DNA, and some larger number of undetected false
convictions in robberies and serious violent crimes for which DNA
collection is not possible.7 ' The National Registry of Exonerations,
maintained as a joint project between the University of Michigan
Law School and The Center for Wrongful Convictions at
Northwestern University School of Law, lists 1553 cases since 1989
in which a person was wrongly convicted but later exonerated by
new evidence of innocence. 5
If there were no discernible evidence patterns in these cases,
the legal system may simply have to chalk up the errors to
unfortunate instances of a fallible justice system. However, the DNA
exoneration cases show a clear pattern of eyewitness error:
approximately seventy-six percent of the cases involved a witness
who made an identification error, and in some cases multiple
witnesses identified the same innocent suspect. 6 The National
69. Id.
70. THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT: RESTORING FREEDOM 11
(2013), available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/files/IP-AR 2013_final.pdf.
71. See id.
72. Samuel R. Gross, Kristen Jacoby, Daniel J. Matheson & Nicholas
Montgomery, Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY523, 530-31 (2005).
73. Id. at 531.
74. Id.
75. The Nat'l Registry of Exonerations, About the Registry, U. MICH. L. SCH.,
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx (last visited
Apr. 25, 2015).
76. GARRETT, supra note 63, at 9.
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Registry of Exonerations reports that mistaken identifications have
been involved in approximately thirty-five percent of exoneration
cases and in eighty-three percent of robbery and seventy-three
percent of sexual assault cases. 7 Thus, substantial attention has
been drawn to eyewitness error as a major contributor to unjust
convictions, and DNA exonerations have become the catalyst for
lineup reform in some jurisdictions."' For example, in the wake of
the New Jersey State v. Cromedy decision-an eyewitness evidence
case in which a DNA test of biological evidence collected from the
victim exonerated the defendant' ,-Attorney General John Farmer
turned to the lineup reforms recommended by researchers.8s Using
the unique authority granted to the Attorney General in that state,
Farmer implemented mandatory statewide guidelines, making New
Jersey the first state to uniformly adopt double-blind sequential
lineup procedures.8'
The DNA exoneration cases deliver a specific lesson about
eyewitness error that aligns well with a persistent scientific question.
Namely, the lineups that produced identification errors did not
include the real culprit.8 2 The police had a suspect, of course, but
that suspect was not the perpetrator of the crime. Yet these well-
intentioned eyewitnesses chose the innocent suspect and went on
to accuse him in a courtroom. 3 Clearly, the lineup member chosen
could not have matched the witness's memory of the culprit and
yet, these witnesses failed to claim "he's not there" or "I don't
77. The Nat'l of Registry Exonerations, The Registry, Exonerations and False
Convictions, U. MICH. L. SCH., http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration
/Pages/learnmore.aspx (last visited Feb. 24, 2015) (expand "Basic Patterns"
hyperlink).
78. THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, REEVALUATING LINEUPS: WHY WITNESSES MAKE
MISTAKES AND HOW TO REDUCE THE CHANGE OF MISIDENTIFICATION 4 (2009),
available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/files/imported/eyewitness-id
_report-5.pdf.
79. 727 A.2d 457 (N.J. 1999).
80. Memorandum from John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney Gen. of N.J., to All
Cnty. Prosecutors, Col. Carson J. Dunbar, Jr., Superintendent, NJSP, All Police
Chiefs & All Law Enforcement Chief Execs. (Apr. 18, 2011), available at
http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/agguide/photoid.pdf.
81. JAMES DOYLE, TRUE WITNESS: COPS, COURTS, SCIENCE AND THE BATTLE
AGAINST MISIDENTIFICATION 192-95 (2005).
82. Laura Smalarz & Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness-Identification Evidence: Scientific
Advances and the New Burden on Trial Judges, 48 CT. REV.: J. AM. JUDGES ASS'N 14, 16
(2012).
83. See id. at 17-21.
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recognize any of these faces"-which would have been the correct
answer to a lineup in which the culprit is not present.
And, there is more to the problem. It is not just the
identification that can drive an investigation forward, convince a
prosecutor to charge a case, or be compelling evidence at trial.
That eyewitness must also be confident. Thus, the perplexing
question for eyewitness scientists: Why does an eyewitness select a
lineup member even in the absence of recognition memory?"
Furthermore, how can an eyewitness who has made a wrong
identification be so confident? And a very important final question:
Why did the witness specifically choose the suspect from the lineup if
he or she is innocent?
C. Why Do Eyewitnesses Make Errors?
Consider the ideal eyewitness: All sensory systems operate
optimally (including required eyewear and absence of ear-buds), in
an attentive, calm, and non-intoxicated witness, within a situation
that provides an unobstrncted, well-illuminated view at a distance
and for a duration of time that allows a reasonable study of the
culprit and circumstances. The ideal witness will attend to and
perceive all that transpires; encode this information completely,
meaningfully, and accurately into memory; retain the information
across time; and then retrieve and report it faithfully and fully when
requested by investigators. 5 This ideal witness has passed through
four ste ps of a simple model akin to the operation of our memory
system. Eyewitnesses perceive stimuli and subsequently encode,
87retain, and retrieve information and images. This simple example
of the ideal witness is an appealing device for grasping the witness
experience and for understanding all that can go wrong in the
eyewitness account of a crime. 8 Because, alas, this ideal witness
84. See Gary L. Wells, Brian Cutler & Lisa Hasel, The Duke Lacrosse Rape
Investigation: How Not to Do Eyewitness-Identification Procedures, in RACE TO INJUSTICE:
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE DUKE LACROSSE RAPE CASE 307, 310-11 (Michael Siegel
ed., 2009).
85. See Memory Processes, HUM. MEMORY, http://www.human-memory.net
/processes.html (last visitedJan. 26, 2015).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Eyewitness Memory for People and Events,
in 11 HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY 149, 149-50 (2d ed. 2003).
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does not exist. In the next paragraphs, witness vulnerability to error
at each of these four stages is explored.
1. Estimator and System Variables
There is a useful forensic distinction to be made between the
first two steps of the eyewitness memory experience (perception
and encoding) and the final two steps (retention and retrieval).
Even before law enforcement arrives on the scene, many factors will
influence perception and encoding processes. Consider a
distracted witness who only briefly views three strangers wearing
dark glasses and hats under conditions of poor lighting at a
substantial distance. Research supports common-sense assumptions
89 909that short crime duration, greater distance, poor illumination, 9'
offender disguises,9 ' and distractions from full attention9' will
diminish the quality of eyewitness memory.9'
Research has also uncovered influences on memory that may
not always be common knowledge.95 Three examples from the
eyewitness literature illustrate this point. First, witness fear and
stress are likely to diminish, rather than aid, the quality of memory,
89. Memon, Hope & Bull, supra note 58, at 348.
90. James Michael Lampinen, William Blake Erickson, Kara N. Moore &
Aaron Hittson, Effects of Distance on Face Recognition: Implications for Eyewitness
Identification, 21 PSYCHONOMIc BULL. & REv. 1489, 1493 (2014).
91. See generally A. Daniel Yarmey, Verbal, Visual, and Voice Identification of a
Rape Suspect Under Different Levels of llumination, 71 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 363 (1986).
92. See Peter N. Shapiro & Steven Penrod, Meta-Analysis of Facial Identification
Studies, 100 PSYCHOL. BULL. 139, 143 (1986).
93. See Jonathan M. Fawcett, Emily J. Russell, Kristine A. Peace & John
Christie, Of Guns and Geese: A Meta-Analytic Review of the 'Weapon Focus' Literature, 19
PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 35, 36 (2013).
94. See Brian H. Bornstein, Kenneth A. Deffenbacher, Steven D. Penrod & E.
Kiernan McGorty, Effects of Exposure Time and Cognitive Operations on Facial
Identification Accuracy: A Meta-Analysis of Two Variables Associated with Initial Memory
Strength, 18 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 473 passim (2012) (finding that social judgments
at the time of exposure and short exposure duration negatively impact eyewitness
memory).
95. Richard A. Wise & Martin A. Safer, A Comparison of What U.S. Judges and
Students Know and Believe About Eyewitness Testimony, 40 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL.
1400, 1400 (2010); Richard A. Wise, Martin A. Safer & Christina M. Maro, What
U.S. Law Enforcement Officers Know and Believe About Eyewitness Factors, Eyewitness
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contrary to common wisdom.9" The human "fight or flight"
physiological response to threat-that mobilizes energy for the
physical action of fighting hard or running fast-is geared toward
enhancing prospects of survival, not memory.97 While the gist of the
frightening experience is not easily forgotten, details are often not
encoded correctly, if at all.9 s
A second well-documented phenomenon is the "weapon focus
effect. ' " Research shows that a weapon is likely to draw the
attention of the witness, reducing time for attention directed to
facial features.' 0  Lab studies indicate that presence (versus
absence) of a weapon reduces accuracy of later lineup
identifications. 01
A third example is that identification errors are significantly
more likely when the event is "cross-race.",0 2 Most people are much
better at encoding facial details for members of their own race than
other races. 0 3 A meta-analysis of studies spanning thirty years and
encompassing the laboratory experiences of nearly 5000 research
participants found that witnesses were 1.40 times more likely to
correctly identify a previously-seen face of their own race compared
to a face of another race, and 1.56 times more likely to falsely
identify an other-race face never seen before.0 4
Unfortunately, the justice system cannot mandate whether the
race of the victim is the same as the offender, whether or not the
offender carries a weapon, the illumination of the offender's face,
and additional critical factors. These many factors that diminish the
quality of witness memory during perception and encoding are out
of the control of law enforcement. Furthermore, the impact of
96. See Kenneth A. Deffenbacher, Brian H. Bornstein, Steven D. Penrod & E.
Kiernan McGorty, A Meta-Analytic Review of the Effects of High Stress on Eyewitness
Memory, 28 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 687, 687 (2004).
97. See id. at 687-88.
98. Id. at 699, 703.
99. Nancy M. Steblay, A Meta-Analytic Review of the Weapon Focus Effect, 16 LAw
&HUM. BEHAV. 413, 413 (1992).
100. Id. at 421-22.
101. Id. at 420. See generally Fawcett, Russell, Peace & Christie, supra note 93
(discussing the effect of weapons presence on memory).
102. See Christian A. Meissner & John C. Brigham, Thirty Years of Investigating
the Own-Race Bias in Memory for Faces: A Meta-Analytic Review, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y
&L. 3, 3 (2001).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 15.
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these issues on any specific witness can only be estimated after the
fact. Thus, these factors are referred to as "estimator variables."'
15
Once law enforcement has arrived on the scene, however,
investigators can potentially control subsequent influences on
witness memory. Impact of these "system variables" can be adjusted
by the legal system through better procedures.' System variables
have become the focus of lineup procedural recommendations. For
example, best police practices require that witnesses be interviewed
sooner rather than later, that witness interviews be documented
immediately, and that co-witnesses be separated before they confer
in order to avoid memory contamination.17 Some of these practices
cannot always be achieved (e.g., multiple witnesses to a crime
frequently share their impressions before police have a chance to
interview them),' °8 but many can be applied with greater
consistency.
2. Eyewitness Memory Vulnerabilities During Memory Retention and
Retrieval
An eyewitness to a crime is placed in an undesirable and
unusual circumstance. There is often a powerful self-imposed
pressure, as well as a push from investigators, family, and/or the
media, to generate a detailed and coherent narrative of what
happened and who is responsible. Witnesses may second-guess
their own version of events when hearing co-witness accounts or
details from a case investigator or other sources. For example, the
'John Doe" sought in a costly FBI manhunt following the
Oklahoma bombing of 1995 is now believed to have been non-
existent, although three eyewitnesses described Timothy McVeigh's
105. Gary L. Wells, Applied Eyewitness Testimony Research: System Variables and
Estimator Variables, 36J. PERSONALITY& SOC. PSYCHOL. 1546, 1548 (1978).
106. Id. at 1552-54.
107. See TECHNICAL WORKING GRP. FOR EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 21, 24 (1999)
[hereinafter NIJ GUIDE], available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij
/178240.pdf.
108. Helen M. Paterson & Richard 1. Kemp, Comparing Methods of Encountering
Post-Event Information: The Power of Co-Witness Suggestion, 20 APPLIED COGNITIVE
PSYCHOL. 1083, 1083 (2006); Elin M. Skagerberg & Daniel B. Wright, The Prevalence
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"accomplice" at the time.' , The co-witnesses at a truck rental shop
were apparently influenced by one employee who recalled
confidently that Timothy McVeigh was with another man when he
rented the truck used in the bombing."0 All three witnesses
described the accomplice to investigators-after they first shared
their recall with one another."'
The human cognitive system is a marvelous structure for
building one's knowledge base through learning and reasoning
processes. At the same time, the memory and decision processes
that work adequately for us most of the time may not work ideally
for eyewitnesses. For example, an otherwise usefil cognitive
function that purges or updates old information in favor of new
may present difficulties for the eyewitness."'
It is not surprising that eyewitnesses forget both important and
unimportant details as time goes by, as we all do." 3 But, eyewitness
memory also can err through commission, incorporating new
information that may seemingly sharpen the experience or shape
the narrative for the witness in ways that, even if factually correct,
become no longer a veridical report of that eyewitness's original
experience. This is illustrated in the manner in which we
incorporate new information seamlessly into our cognitive system
and in the way we can reason ourselves into an answer in the
absence of requisite knowledge.
3. Incorporation of New Information
As has been cautioned now for decades, eyewitness memory is
not like a play-back system that can be accessed for a clean, full
version of a past event. Information encoded into memory at the
time of a crime is not stored in pristine or immutable condition but
is instead quite vulnerable to revision, contrary to a common
109. Amina Memon & Daniel B. Wright, Eyewitness Testimony and the Oklahoma
Bombing, 12 PSYCHOLOGIST 292, 293 (1999); see also DANIEL L. SCHACTER, THE SEVEN
SINS OF MEMORY: HOW THE MIND FORGETS AND REMEMBERS 91-92 (2002).
110. Memon & Wright, supra note 109, at 293.
111. Id.
112. SCHACTER, supra note 109, at 191. For a discussion on suggestibility, see
generally id. at 112-37.
113. See Shapiro & Penrod, supra note 92, at 143, 151 (finding that the time
between an incident and identification has a statistically significant effect on
positive and false eyewitness identification).
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assumption of an image "burned into memory."" 4 Memories are
not so much "retrieved" as they are "reconstructed," often using
current knowledge to understand the past event or to fill in a gap
in the story in ways that make sense within a personal belief
system.' 5 Furthermore, the content of new information is better
remembered than the source of that information.'6
Thus, eyewitness veracity is dually cursed by the likelihood that
original memory of the crime event will be tainted by new external
information 7 and that the witness will be unable to effectively
parse information into what she knows now, versus what she knew
at the time of the crime (a source monitoring error)." 8 An
eyewitness may replace (or confuse) a perpetrator's face with
another image-of an innocent lineup member, a police
composite, or a face seen in a mug-shot or other post-event
context. Nevertheless, the subsequent "memory" is often quite
compelling to the eyewitness, investigators, and jury. A challenge
for eyewitness researchers and the legal system is to assess the level
of reconstruction that afflicts an eyewitness's memory report.
One of the most riveting and well-publicized DNA exoneration
cases, the rape conviction of Ronald Cotton, includes a chain of
identification tasks-a composite sketch, a photo lineup, a physical
114. Elizabeth F. Loftus, Planting Misinformation in the Human Mind: A 30-Year
Investigation of the Malleability of Memory, 12 LEARNING & MEMORY 361, 361 (2005).
115. See id. at 363-64.
116. See Even Brown, Kenneth Deffenbacher & William Sturgill, Memory for
Faces and Circumstances of Encounter, 62 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 311, 312-13, 317
(1977); see also SCHACTER, supra note 109, at 92-93.
117. This is called the misinformation effect. See, e.g., Loftus, supra note 114,
at 361.
118. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Deffenbacher, Brian H. Bornstein & Steven D.
Penrod, Mugshot Exposure Effects: Retroactive Interference, Source Confusion, and
Unconscious Transference, 30 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 287, 306 (2006).
119. See SCHACTER, supra note 109, at 92-93 (discussing unconscious
transference); Elizabeth F. Loftus, Unconscious Transference in Eyewitness
Identification, 2 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 93, 96-98 (1976) (analyzing an unconscious
transference experiment).
120. See State v. Clopten, 223 P.3d 1103, 1108 (Utah 2009) ("Indeed, juries
seemed to be swayed the most by the confidence of an eyewitness, even though
such confidence only correlates weakly with accuracy."). See generally Richard A.
Wise, Clifford S. Fishman & Martin A. Safer, How to Analyze the Accuracy of Eyewitness
Testimony in a Criminal Case, 42 CONN. L. REv. 435 (2009) (discussing eyewitness
overconfidence in their own testimony and studies demonstrating that even judges
and attorneys are uninformed on identification accuracy).
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lineup, an in-court ID-during which the face of the rapist, Bobby
Poole, was replaced in the victim's memory with that of innocent
Ronald Cotton. With one hundred percent confidence at trial,
victim Jennifer Thompson called the day of Cotton's conviction,
"the happiest day of my life 1 22 but failed to recognize Poole when
she finally was confronted with him."'
In at least fourteen DNA-exoneration cases "the exoneree was
the only person repeated in multiple viewings" by the same• 124
eyewitness. These cases have the common thread of mistaken
identification by eyewitnesses who became increasingly but
erroneously convinced of the culprit's identity across two or more
identification tasks. 125 Eyewitness research similarly demonstrates
the problems for eyewitness identification of repeated
identification tasks."" Repeated identification tasks are not•127juidcinhaen wrtn
uncommon in practice. Yet, most jurisdictions have no written
policies about identification practices."'
4. Memory Strength and Reasoning Processes
Remember back to a past exam of multiple-choice items-a
college exam, a written driver's test, the LSAT, or the SAT. For
some items, a quick scan of the response options was enough to
immediately recognize the answer. For other items, the correct
121. See generally JENNIFER THOMPSON-CANNINO, RONALD COTTON & ERIN
TORNEO, PICKING COTrON: OUR MEMOIR OF INJUSTICE AND REDEMPTION (2009)
(providing an account of the events and process surrounding Cotton's false rape
conviction).
122. Jennifer Thompson, 'I Was Certain, But I Was Wrong,' N.Y. TIMES (June
18, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/06/18/opinion/i-was-certain-but-i-was
-wrong.html.
123. THOMPSON-CANNINO, COTTON & TORNEO, supra note 121, at 134.
124. GARRET, supra note 63, at 59.
125. See id. at 63-68 (discussing false confidence in eyewitness identifications).
126. See Nancy K. Steblay, Robert W. Tix & Samantha L. Benson, Double
Exposure: The Effects of Repeated Identification Lineups on Eyewitness Accuracy, 27
APPLIED COGNITWVE PSYCHOL. 644, 652 (2013).
127. See generally Bruce W. Behrman & Sherrie L. Davey, Eyewitness Identification
in Actual Criminal Cases: An Archival Analysis, 25 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 475, 477-78
(2001) (discussing prior and later identifications); Nancy K. Steblay, What We Know
Now: The Evanston Illinois Lineups, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 1-12 (2011) (analyzing
the difficulties repeated identification practices impose upon comparing
eyewitness data in different jurisdictions).
128. See POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 66, at 46.
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answer did not jump out. Memory failed, so a secondary strategy
was called up: eliminate unlikely options, try to find a decipherable
cue in the question itself, or make a best guess. Helpful assistance
from others might even have been attempted (another test-taker or
the instructor).
In a similar manner, eyewitnesses are asked to report whether
they recognize a suspect from a lineup. 29 A witness may have an
immediate recognition experience, a fast automatic positive
identification (a 'jump-out"). In the absence of immediate
recognition-when memory for the culprit is not strong, culprit
appearance has changed, or the culprit is not in the lineup-
secondary processes will be prompted: slower, more effortful and
deliberative modes of decision making. 30 These psychological
processes involve a continuum of judgment from automatic to
deliberative. 3' The witness using a deliberative process may be
essentially attempting to find the suspect, a reasoning process that
is quite different from immediate recognition. This difference in
decision strategy has implications for the quality of evidence from a
positive identification, and provides a basis for the procedural
improvements recommended by scientists. 33
One common secondary strategy in our daily lives is to
respond to a difficult question by answering an easier one, usually
without noticing the change in tack. 34 This strategy is often
129. See GARRETr, supra note 63, at 59-62 (discussing aspects of the eyewitness
identification procedure).
130. See David Dunning & Lisa Beth Stern, Distinguishing Accurate from
Inaccurate Eyewitness Identifications via Inquiries About Decision Processes, 67 J.
PERSONAL=Y& SOC. PSYCHOL. 818, 819 (1994).
131. See Steve Charman & Gary L. Wells, Applied Lineup Theory, in 2 THE
HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS PSYCHOLOGY: MEMORY FOR PEOPLE 219, 237-40 (R. C. L.
Lindsay et al. eds., 2006). See generally Steve D. Charman & Gary L. Wells, The
Moderating Effect of Ecphoric Experience on Post-Identification Feedback: A Critical Test of
the Cues-Based Inference Conceptualization, 26 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 243, 244
(2012) [hereinafter Charman & Wells, The Moderating Effect of Ecphoric Experience]
(discussing the cues-based inference conceptualization).
132. Charman & Wells, The Moderating Effect of Ecphoric Experience, supra note
131, at 244 ("Furthermore, the more similar an innocent suspect is to the culprit
(and hence the stronger the ecphoric experience), the higher a witness's
confidence.").
133. Id. at 249 ("[W]e continue to advocate the use of methods that prevent
post-identification feedback altogether, whether confirming or disconfirming.").
134. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW97-99 (2011).
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successful and rather effortless. 5 For example, when we try to
locate a vaguely-remembered server mid-meal in a restaurant (Was
that the young man who took my order?), the answer to an
alternative question may easily suffice (Which of these servers is
closest to what I remember?). An error in this scenario has limited if
any repercussions.
This process of choosing the closest to memory is well-known in
lineup literature. In this context, however, repercussions are very
serious. Relative judgment is the comparison of lineup members to
one another in order to select the one who looks most like the
offender relative to the other lineup members."" Relative judgment
may work well if the culprit is in the lineup.'37 However, the
intuitive "correctness" of relative judgment for the witness produces
a dangerous situation when police place an innocent suspect in a
lineup, particularly one who resembles the true culprit. A witness
who moves from an absolute (this is the guy!) to a relative (closest!)
judgment strategy places an innocent suspect at risk.1
3
8
Research indicates that a very difficult task for eyewitnesses is
to recognize when the culprit is not in the lineup.' 39 This
straightforward conceptualization of relative judgment as a secondary
decision strategy is rich in its implications for lineup procedural
revisions and has provided the basis for recommended new lineup
procedures. For example, the sequential (one-at-a-time) lineup was
developed as a means to reduce witness reliance on relative
judgment when immediate recognition fails. 4 '
135. See id.
136. Gary L. Wells, The Psychology of Lineup Identifications, 14J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 89, 89 (1984).
137. See id. at 93.
138. Gary L. Wells, What Do We Know About Eyewitness Identification?, 48 J. AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 553, 560 (1993). See generally R. C. L. Lindsay & Gary L. Wells,
Improving Eyewitness Identification: Simultaneous Versus Sequential Lineup Presentations,
70 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 556, 562 (1985) (recommending the use of sequential
lineups to "force witnesses away from the possibility of using a relative-judgment
strategy").
139. Wells, supra note 138, at 560.
140. See Lindsay & Wells, supra note 138, at 561. See generally Gary L. Wells,
Eyewitness Identification: Systemic Reforms, 2006 Wis. L. REv. 615, 643.
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D. Can Eyewitness Error Be Prevented?
The legal system is very clear in its expectation for eyewitness
identification evidence. An identification must be the result of an
independent recollection by the witness and must not be
influenced by administrator cues, suggestive procedures, case
evidence, or any form of external intrusion. 14' In Perry, the United
States Supreme Court strongly reiterated that unnecessary
suggestiveness in police procedures is a constitutional issue of due
process that gives rise to judicial review and possible suppression of
the evidence.
A lineup must fairly secure the identification of a culprit or
exonerate an innocent suspect based on the witness's memory
alone.143 This basic lejal premise underlies reforms for eyewitness
evidence procedures. The challenge for researchers and for the
legal system therefore has been to develop identification
procedures that tap legitimate witness recognition of the culprit
and avoid procedural bias or suggestiveness that may compromise
witness reliance on memory alone.11 At the same time, eyewitness
scientists have illuminated the troublesome fact that too frequently
eyewitnesses make a lineup pick even when memory is weak,
increasing the risk of a mistaken identification.
46
Ideally then, lineup procedures should capture the original
experience of the eyewitness (without external influence), should
be fair to the suspect (avoiding suggestiveness), and should
minimize procedural biases that may prompt witnesses with weak or
no memory of the culprit to choose from the lineup. Procedural
biases may operate as general-impairment or specific suspect. 47 A
general-impairment bias (or more simply, general bias) pushes a witness
to make an identification, but the push is not necessarily directed
toward the suspect. Specific suspect bias (or more simply, suspect
bias) points the witness toward the suspect and away from the
141. See, e.g., Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 733 (2012).
142. Id. at 724-25.
143. See State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 685-88 (Or. 2012).
144. Id.
145. Wells, Steblay & Dysart, supra note 52, at 268.
146. Wells, supra note 65, at 13.
147. Neil Brewer & Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification, 20 CuRRENT
DIREaIONS PSYCHOL. Sci. 24, 24-25 (2011); Wells & Loftus, supra note 88, at 156.
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fillers, who are the known-innocent members of the lineup. 49 For
example, a biased lineup instruction ("Which of these is the
person?") may prompt more identifications and thereby incur an
increase in witness choosing but it does not explicitly implicate the
suspect (a general-impairment bias). On the other hand, a poorly
constructed lineup in which only the suspect bears resemblance to
the witness's description of the culprit will likely prompt a witness
to pick the suspect (a specific suspect bias) .5O Similarly, repeated
identification tasks involving the same witness and suspect produce
specific bias against a suspect, because a suspect may stand out in a
lineup when he or she has appeared in a prior identification
context: a mug shot book, a show-up (presentation of the suspect
alone), or an earlier lineup. 5 ' The issue of specific suspect bias is
quite relevant to jury considerations. A jury may hear a case in
which encoding and retention conditions were clearly substandard
(e.g., a witness with a poor view who makes a cross-race
identification long after the event). 52 Yet, the jury may be
minimally impressed by warnings about general-impairment
concerns, because, after all, the witness still picked the defendant
from a lineup. Suspect-bias variables, on the other hand, can
provide an answer to the pressing question of why the witness
picked this defendant if he or she is not guilty."'
IV. SCIENTIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LINEUP PROCEDURE
The lineup procedural revisions recommended by scientists to
increase the reliability of eyewitness evidence include components
of lineup construction, lineup instructions to the witness,
presentation of the lineup, and recording of lineup results.
A. Lineup Construction
The purpose of a lineup is for law enforcement to gather
reliable evidence to test a suspicion that the suspect is indeed the
149. Brewer & Wells, supra note 147, at 24-25; Wells & Loftus, supra note 88,
at 156.
150. Brewer & Wells, supra note 147, at 25.
151. Id.
152. See generally Wells & Loftus, supra note 88, at 150-52 (discussing the
eyewitness misidentification of Thomas Brewster over a decade after the crime
occurred, which brought him to trial for murder).
153. See Brewer & Wells, supra note 147, at 25.
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perpetrator. Law enforcement presents a single suspect to the
witnesses along with "fillers" (known innocents) of similar physical
attributes.15 A witness's firm rejection of a lineup ("He's not
there.") may prompt police to reevaluate their suspicion about the
suspect.155 A filler selection can indicate a weak witness memory or
that the filler looks more like the perpetrator than does the
suspect.156 And, of course, a suspect identification offers
incriminating evidence against the suspect.
Properly selected lineup fillers help to ensure that the lineup
does not immediately suggest to the witness who the police think
the suspect is (i.e., it avoids a suspect bias). 57 When all fillers match
the witness's description of the culprit and no lineup member
stands out, the witness cannot use a simple process of elimination
to arrive at the suspect. 58 An eyewitness whose memory is weak
should be dissuaded by the many unfamiliar faces in the lineup
from falsely claiming recognition of the suspect.
Furthermore, suppose a witness with a poor memory
nevertheless makes a lineup pick, perhaps using relative
judgment.59 The risk to an innocent suspect is diminished if that
risk is spread across lineup fillers. "' With a fairly-constructed lineup
of six members, the likelihood that any one lineup member will be
chosen by chance is one in six. Thus, the likelihood that an
innocent suspect will be chosen by a witness who is simply guessing
is one in six. A larger lineup can further reduce risk to an innocent
suspect; for example, an eight-member lineup decreases the risk to
an innocent suspect to one in eight. This rationale exposes the
154. Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, Eyewitness Identification: Information
Gain from Incriminating and Exonerating Behaviors, 8 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:
APPLIED 155, 156 (2002).
155. Id.
156. Gary L. Wells, Yueran Yang & Laura Smalarz, Eyewitness Identification:
Bayesian Information Gain, Base Rate Effect-Equivalency Curves, and
Reasonable Suspicion, LAW & HUM. BEHAV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 23),
available at http://public.psych.iastate.edu/glwells/Wells%20pdfs/2010-/Wells
_YangSmalarz LHB_.pdf.
157. Wells, Memon & Penrod, supra note 11, at 62.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 63.
160. Nancy Steblay, Jennifer Dysart, Solomon Fulero & R. C. L. Lindsay,
Eyewitness Accuracy Rates in Police Showup and Lineup Presentations: A Meta-Analytic
Comparison, 27 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 523, 535-36 (2003).
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problem of a show-up, in which a single suspect is unprotected
from a simple guess.',,
The recommendation that only one suspect be included in a
lineup is based on this logic, which asserts that risk from an
unreliable witness can and should be spread away from an innocent162
suspect. The extreme end of a contrary lineup construction
strategy-an all-suspect lineup-can be seen in the Duke University
lacrosse team rape case that came to attention in 2006. The witness,
who described the multiple offenders as lacrosse team members,
was shown a series of lineups with all team members, including one
display with all forty-six lacrosse players. 63 There were no fillers.'64
Any witness pick would incriminate that selected team member-
just as throwing a dart at the photos would have netted a suspect
hit. In short, the procedures used were non-diagnostic for the guilt
or innocence of the young men in the lineup. And, it is important
to note that the absence of fillers in the lineups also meant that the
witness's credibility could not be challenged; she could not make a
"wrong" pick. 165
Police do not know if the suspect is the culprit when they build
the lineup. Therefore, fair lineup construction requires a method
of fit-to-description as a means to limit bias against a suspect who may
be innocent.' That is, all lineup members should match the
description of the culprit provided by the eyewitness. Variability in
lineup member appearance is allowed around the core verbal
descriptors provided by the witness, a method that avoids both an
impossible "clone" lineup and one that unfairly flags the suspect.167
161. Id. at 525.
162. Gary L. Wells & John W. Turtle, Eyewitness Identification: The Importance of
Lineup Models, 99 PSYCHOL. BULL. 320, 322 (1986).
163. Wells, Cutler & Hasel, supra note 84, at 316.
164. Id. at 318-19.
165. Id.
166. Gary L. Wells, Mark Small, Steven Penrod, Roy S. Malpass, Solomon M.
Fulero & C. A. E. Brimacombe, Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations
for Lineups and Photospreads, 22 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 25 (1998). See generally Gary
L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, "Good, You Identified the Suspect": Feedback to Eyewitnesses
Distorts Their Reports of the Witnessing Experience, 83J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 360 (1998)
(discussing the effect of positive feedback following eyewitness identification of a
suspect).
167. Gary L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, Measuring the Goodness of Lineups:
Parameter Estimation, Question Effects, and Limits to the Mock Witness Paradigm, 13
APPLIED COGNrIVE PSYCHOL. S27, S38 (1999).
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A lineup constructed to increase physical similarity beyond the
level of witness description provides no additional protection to the
innocent suspect and can harm the eyewitness's ability to identify
the perpetrator.
B. Lineup Instructions
One of the most intractable problems of eyewitness
identification is that many witnesses will choose a lineup member
when they in fact should have said "he's not there" or "I don't
, 68know.' It appears that inherent pressure of a lineup scenario or
the expectations that the perpetrators must be in the lineup
prompts witnesses to make lineup selections even in the absence of
clear recognition. Witnesses may shift to relative judgment-
picking the lineup member closest to memory-a process that
places an innocent suspect at risk.169 One means to reduce witness
reliance on relative judgment, that is, to inhibit witnesses from
picking from a lineup when they do not have sufficient memory
strength, is to provide an instruction that (correctly) informs them
that the culprit they saw may not be in the lineup. The
recommendation is for an explicit instruction to the witness that
the offender may or may not be in the lineup, thereby also allowing
that "none of the above" may be the correct and reasonable
response to the lineup."7° The NIJ Guide embraced this
recommendation,"' and this cautionary instruction has become a
noncontroversial policy reform in many U.S. jurisdictions.
This author recently evaluated sixteen experimental lab
studies in a meta-analysis that specifically tested the presence versus
absence of a may-or-may-not instruction.1 2 The instruction
significantly reduced identification errors when the culprit was
missing from the lineup, from seventy percent to forty-three
percent, and a designated innocent suspect was picked by half as
many witnesses (nineteen percent vs. forty percent). This
168. Smalarz & Wells, supra note 82, at 15.
169. Wells, supra note 136, at 100; Wells, Memon & Penrod, supra note 11, at
61.
170. NIJ GUIDE, supra note 107, at 31-32.
171. Id.
172. Nancy K. Steblay, Lineup Instructions, in REFORM OF EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES 65, 68-72 (Brian L. Cutler ed., 2013).
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instruction also led to a non-significant and small (five percent)
loss of correct identifications.175 The research is clear: an
instruction that specifically alerts the witness to the possibility that
the true perpetrator may not be in the lineup significantly
decreases erroneous witness picks from the lineup, compared to an
instruction that suggests culprit presence in the array. The primary
impact of the admonition is to inhibit choosing from witnesses who
otherwise would make identification errors, an avoidance of a
general bias.
C. Double-Blind Lineup Administration
A standard protective measure of experimental and clinical
research design is a double-blind procedure, in which neither the
research participant nor the experimenter knows whether the
participant is in the treatment or control group."' In medical
research, double-blind procedure requires that neither the
evaluating clinician nor the patient know whether the patient is
receiving the treatment or a placebo. The purpose is that the
double-blind procedure protects against the inadvertent impact of
knowledge that could taint research results (how the clinician
interacts with the patient, records patient information and
evaluates clinical outcomes, and how the patient perceives and
reports the experience). The double-blind procedure also protects
the research against claims of influence or bias.17
In lineup practice, most police already use a "single-blind"
procedure. The eyewitness is not told who the suspect is in the
lineup (i.e., police do not instruct the witness: "Here is a lineup of
six guys. We think number three is the one who robbed you. What
do you think?"). Of course, this would be highly suggestive and
contradict the purpose of the lineup. The scientific
recommendation is that lineup procedures should in fact be
"double-blind" to keep both the eyewitness and lineup
administrator unaware of which lineup member is the police178
suspect. The lineup administrator does not know which lineup
175. Id. at 72.
176. Wells, Steblay & Dysart, supra note 52, at 266.
177. Id.
178. Jennifer E. Dysart, Victoria Z. Lawson & Anna Rainey, Blind Lineup
Administration as a Prophylactic Against the Postidentification Feedback Effect, 36 LAw &
HUM. BEHAV. 312, 312 (2012).
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member is the suspect, and furthermore, the witness is informed
that the administrator does not know. This protocol avoids
unintentional leaks of information from the lineup administrator
regarding which lineup member is the suspect and which are mere
fillers (a suspect bias) and cautions the witness that administrator
comments or behaviors are not helpful clues to who the suspect
is. 79 As in clinical trials, double-blind procedure prompts recording
clarity and integrity and protects against claims of administrator
influence.' I
The recommendation for a double blind identification
procedure was issued over two decades ago and has been longS • 181
endorsed by eyewitness scientists. Identifications from lineups
conducted by blind administrators have been found to be more
diagnostic of suspect guilt than those conducted under a non-blind
procedure.1 s2 Exploration of the underlying conditions for witness
vulnerability to influence has found that the impact from non-blind
administrators is greatest when the lineup procedure is also
affected by general bias factors of biased lineup instructions and
simultaneous lineup format. 8 3 Non-blind administrators behave
differently toward witnesses.1s4  Yet, both witnesses and
administrators may be unaware of administrator influence. s5
Beyond the worry of direct influence during the lineup
procedure, there are additional negative effects of the non-blind
lineup administration after the lineup decision is made. Research
has established the impact of a non-blind lineup administrator on
the written report of the lineup procedure and outcomes. An
179. See id. at 312-19.
180. Dario N. Rodriguez & Melissa A. Berry, The Effect of Lineup Administrator
Blindness on Recording of Eyewitness Identification Decisions, 19 LEGAL &
CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 69, 69-79 (2014); see also Keith A. Findley & Michael S.
Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 Wis. L. REV.
291,291-397.
181. GARY L. WELLS, EYEwrrNESS IDENTIFIcATION: A SYSTEM HANDBOOK 75
(1988); Wells, Small, Penrod, Malpass, Fulero & Brimacombe, supra note 166, at
603-47.
182. Sarah M. Greathouse & Margaret Bull Kovera, Instruction Bias and Lineup
Presentation Moderate the Effects of Administrator Knowledge on Eyewitness Identification,
33 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 70, 79 (2009).
183. Id. at 76.
184. Id. at 71-72; see also Ryan M. Haw & Ronald P. Fisher, Effects of
Administrator-Witness Contact on Eyewitness Identification Accuracy, 89 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 1106, 1106-12 (2004).
185. Greathouse & Kovera, supra note 182, at 79.
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administrative reporting difference was documented in real field
lineups.""3 Analysis of eighty-seven lineups indicated that non-blind
investigators administering simultaneous lineups were forty-four
percent less likely to report verbatim witness comments (e.g.,
"That's him, I recognize the crooked teeth.") than were blind
investigators administering sequential lineups. 1 7  Non-blind
administrators more frequently reported in third-person form (e.g.,
"The witness identified the suspect."), revealing an interpretation
of the lineup outcome filtered through the lens of investigator
knowledge.'Ss In this field comparison, blind status of the lineup
was confounded with lineup format. Nevertheless, the take-away
point is that a blind lineup administrator, by virtue of the lack of
knowledge about the suspect, is unable to interject conclusions
based on case information. In a similar manner, a blind lineup
administrator cannot contaminate a witness's confidence with
comments about the "correctness" of a witness's lineup selection, a
problem that is discussed in a section below.
D. Sequential Lineup Presentation
A traditional identification procedure presents all lineup
members at the same time (simultaneously). Yet, there is no logical
or empirical basis to assume that a reliable witness's memory of the
culprit can be improved with a side-by-side comparison of lineup
members, nor is there a financial benefit of a simultaneousd. , 189
display. Also, there is a risk in the traditional procedure:
simultaneous lineup presentation allows witnesses to engage in
relative judgment, thereby prompting lineup picks (a general bias),
but also increasing risk to an innocent suspect who looks most like
the culprit (a suspect bias).' 90 The scientific recommendation for
increasing the reliability of eyewitness identification evidence is to
employ a sequential rather than simultaneous display of the lineup
members. ' That is, all lineups, photographic or live, should be
presented to the witness one member at a time and the witness
186. Steblay, supra note 127, at 5-7.
187. Id. at 6.
188. Id.
189. Klobuchar, Steblay & Caligiuri, supra note 3, at 385-99.
190. Wells, supra note 138, at 560-62.
191. See generally WELLS, STEBLAY & DYSART, supra note 62.
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should make a decision about each lineup member before moving
to the next.192
A sizable amount of experimental literature has compared
performance of eyewitnesses using the two lineup procedures
(seventy-two studies) . The most complete and recent review has
revealed a common pattern: compared to the simultaneous
procedure, a sequential procedure produces a large reduction in
mistaken identifications (twenty-two percent) with some
accompanying loss of correct identifications (eight percent). 4 The
loss of correct identifications is presumably due to the fact that
witnesses could no longer employ relative judgment to find the
suspect. A subsequent analysis of the same data by a different team
of researchers concluded that the sequential procedure promotes a
more conservative witness decision process ("the tendency of
witnesses to choose from or reject a lineup") . It is likely this more
conservative criterion is responsible for the higher overall accuracy
rates with the sequential procedure.' 96
Sequential and simultaneous lineup procedures were directly
compared in a controlled, randomized field experiment sponsored
by the American Judicature Society (AJS) involving almost 500
lineups, including both real witnesses and real crimes, ranging
from fraud to murder, in four U.S. police jurisdictions. The
lineups were randomly assigned to simultaneous versus sequential
lineup procedures.' Results were in concert with laboratory
findings, in that sequential lineups generated significantly fewer
(11.1%) filler identifications compared to simultaneous lineups
(17.8%), with no loss of suspect identifications.'9
For police, the critical question is: "Is the identification a good
predictor of the suspect's guilt?" Once a witness has made a positive
identification from the lineup, the likelihood that this pick was a
guilty rather than innocent person is better if the lineup was
192. Lindsay & Wells, supra note 138, at 559; Steblay, Dysart & Wells, supra
note 2, at 99, 123.
193. Steblay, Dysart & Wells, supra note 2, at 106.
194. Id. at 99, 123.
195. Matthew A. Palmer & Neil Brewer, Sequential Lineup Presentation Promotes
Less-Biased Criterion Setting but Does Not Improve Discriminability, 36 LAw & HUM.
BEHAV. 247, 247 (2012).
196. Id. at 253.
197. Wells, Steblay & Dysart, supra note 62, at 4-5, 11.
198. Id. at 5.
199. Id. at 13.
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sequential versus simultaneous 0 0  In short, sequential lineup
procedure produces identification evidence that is more
201 2probative. These results are now echoed with the AJS field data.
While suspect identifications did not differ between sequential and
simultaneous field lineups, forty-one percent of witness selections
from simultaneous field lineups were filler picks compared to
thirty-one percent of witness picks from sequential lineups.' °3 In
this way, the sequential procedure increases the probative value of
the identification evidence.
E. Witness Confidence Statements
As noted above, it is not only a positive identification of a
suspect that presents strong evidence at trial, but also high witness
confidence in that identification. The escalation of witness
confidence between identification and court testimony can
potentially be spurred by any number of external sources,
including media reports of a suspect's previous crimes, police or
attorney information about the status of the investigation, or new
knowledge regarding co-witness statements. Thus, confidence at
trial may be substantially higher than that at the identification. For
this reason, best practice is to take a confidence statement in the
witness's own words immediately at the time of the identification
and before feedback about the correctness of that decision arrives
214from any source (as directed in the NIJ Guide).
This procedural recommendation is more nuanced than
perhaps immediately appreciated. The thin slice of time
immediately after the witness's identification is the first point of
vulnerability for what can quickly become false witness
205confidence. A sizable body of research literature has revealed the
astonishing power of a casual positive comment from a lineup
200. See Wells, Steblay & Dysart, supra note 52, at 269; see also Steblay, Dysart &
Wells, supra note 2, at 123.
201. Steblay, Dysart & Wells, supra note 2, at 123.
202. Wells, Steblay & Dysart, supra note 62, at 4-5, 11.
203. Id. at 13. These percentages have been rounded to the closest whole
number.
204. Wells & Bradfield, supra note 166, at 361; see also NIJ GUIDE, supra note
107, at 24-25.
205. See generally Nancy K. Steblay, Gary L. Wells & Amy Bradfield Douglass,
The Eyewitness Post Identification Feedback Effect 15 Years Later: Theoretical and Policy
Implications, 20 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y& L. 1 (2014).
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administrator to affect eyewitness confidence.2 0 In the first study to
examine this phenomenon, witness-participants viewed a security
video and were asked to identify the offender from a lineup. 20 7 The
lineup did not include the offender, yet all witnesses made a
208
selection. Immediately after these mistaken identifications,
(false) confirming feedback was provided to a randomly-assigned
group of witnesses: "Good. You identified the actual 
suspect. '209
Witnesses assigned to the control group were told nothing about
their identification accuracy.f Confirming feedback significantly
inflated witnesses' retrospective confidence reports compared to
the control group. 21' Furthermore, an extensive range of variables
was inflated in conjunction with retrospective certainty, including
witnesses' positive evaluation of their viewing experience for the
crime.2t2 Yet, the witnesses believed that the feedback did not affect
213
their perceptions.
The post-identification feedback effect is robust across studies
214
and noteworthy for multiple reasons. First, witnesses whose
decisions were confirmed became more certain of their
identification both at the time of the feedback (perhaps not
surprisingly) but also retrospectively for the time of the
215iidentification. Importantly, these witnesses typically have made
identifications from culprit-absent lineups; hence, their distorted
reports correspond to mistaken identifications of innocent
210
suspects, a forensically-relevant scenario of critical importance.
This dramatic effect is produced by a simple, casual, even
seemingly helpful, comment from the lineup administrator.
217
Second, memory of the circumstances surrounding the
identification task and the crime itself has been altered. 18 After
206. See generally id.




211. Id. at 367.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. For meta-analysis data, see Steblay, Wells, & Douglass, supra note 205, at
1-18.
215. Id. at 5.
216. Id. at 5-6.
217. SeeWells & Bradfield, supra note 166, at 363.
218. Steblay, Wells & Douglass, supra note 205, at 6.
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confirming feedback, witnesses recalled greater ease and speed of
the identification and reported having had a better view of the
perpetrator, having paid more attention, having had a better basis
to make an identification, and having greater clarity of theS 219
offender's image in mind. These aspects of eyewitness experience
are the very attributes that are likely to bolster eyewitness credibility
in the eyes of investigators, prosecutors, and juries. 22 In short, the
identification evidence has been contaminated.
2 2 '
Additionally, witnesses who received confirming feedback
showed elevation in broader subjective measures: belief that they
possess good memory for strangers, greater trust in eyewitnesses
with similar experiences, and an increased willingness to testify
about their eyewitness experience. 2" This combination-that jurors
are especially willing to believe a confident witness and that lineup
administrators can influence a witness's confidence-poses a. 223
serious problem for courtroom evidence. The confidence of the
221
witness can be misaligned with accuracy, yet a witness who is truly
convinced of the correctness of the testimony will not exude cues
of deception or insincerity.225 Importantly, this post-identification
feedback effect has been replicated with real eyewitnesses to crimesS .. 226
and with both incorrect and correct witness decisions.
How can this slip of a comment be inhibited, so as to prohibit
false confidence? A recent study supports the most frequently
offered advice to law enforcement as to how to avoid post-
identification feedback effects: a blind lineup administrator who
can secure the confidence rating from the witness at the time of the
227lineup.
219. Wells & Bradfield, supra note 166, at 367.
220. Steblay, Wells & Douglass, supra note 205, at 11.
221. Wells & Bradfield, supra note 166, at 367.
222. Steblay, Wells & Douglass, supra note 205, at 5.
223. Id. at 11.
224. Siegfried Ludwig Sporer, Steven Penrod, Don Read & Brian Cutler,
Choosing, Confidence, and Accuracy: A Meta-Analysis of the Confidence-Accuracy Relation
in Eyewitness Identification Studies, 118 PSYCHOL. BULL. 315, 315, 322 (1995).
225. Steblay, Wells & Douglass, supra note 205, at 12.
226. Id. at 7.
227. See Dysart, Lawson & Rainey, supra note 178, at 313.
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V. EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE AND THE COURTS
The United States Supreme Court delivered the Manson v.
Brathwaite228 decision prior to the beginning of an ensuing wave of
eyewitness research studies. The Court established the two-pronged
strategy for the evaluation of eyewitness reliability. 229 First was a
determination of whether the identification procedure was
2231
unnecessarily suggestive .2 If the police procedure is not unduly
suggestive, the identification evidence is allowable at trial. 21' When
the procedure is deemed too suggestive, the second prong of the
strategy is triggered, and the reliability of the evidence is weighed
against five criteria: the witness's opportunity to view the offender,
degree of attention during the crime, certainty at the time of the
identification, the accuracy of the witness's description of the
defendant, and the amount of time elapsed between the crime and
the identification.2 2
The Manson criteria for eyewitness reliability have not fared
well under empirical scrutiny over the past thirty-five years.233 Of
greatest concern is that three of the five Manson criteria are
secured through retrospective self-report of the witness that can be
easily tainted. 2" As we have seen, post-identification feedback can
significantly inflate witness reports of certainty, view, and attention
to the crime.235 This is an unfortunate deficit in the Manson criteria,
that a suggestive police procedure can prompt distortion of the
eyewitness's memory in the very direction that will "pass" the
second Manson prong.236 Therefore, a Manson inquiry is unlikely to
detect the unreliable witness at a pretrial hearing, and Manson does
not incentivize law enforcement to avoid suggestive procedures.
Scientists and legal scholars have called for a new legal
framework for the evaluation of eyewitness reliability based more
228. 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
229. Id. at 114.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 98-99.
233. See generally Gary L. Wells & Deah S. Quinlivan, Suggestive Eyewitness
Identification Procedures and the Supreme Court's Reliability Test in Light of Eyewitness
Science: 30 Years Later, 33 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (2009) (discussing the
shortcomings of the Manson criteria).
234. See id. at 9.
235. See id. at 16.
236. Id. at 4, 16-17.
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tightly on scientific research. 237 The reason for this, articulated in
the Perry scientific brief prepared by the American Psychological
2381Association, includes the fact that traditional tools of the court-
pretrial evidentiary hearings, cross-examination, jury instructions,
and expert testimony-appear to inadequately protect against
unreliable eyewitness testimony.23 9 The problem often rests with a
confident and entirely sincere eyewitness, who is nevertheless
incorrect.
VI. EYEWITNESS MEMORY ANDJURIES
A central point of this article is that the legal system may have
unreasonable expectations for eyewitness memory. Researchers
have documented that jurors typically do not understand
eyewitness memory principles and in fact may hold beliefs contrary
to scientific principles. Nor does it appear that laypersons
understand the implications of police procedure for eyewitness
241accuracy. One study asked experiment participants to judge the
guilt of a suspect when the identification procedure had been
212conducted blind or non-blind. Participants were found to be
243
unaware of the bias that can be incurred with non-blind lineups.
The authors of the study reiterate the need to correct
237. See generally id.
238. Brief for American Psychological Association as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 17-21, Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012)
(No. 10-8974), 2011 WL 3488994, at * 17-21.
239. See id.;Jennifer L. Devenport, Veronica Stinson, Brian L. Cutler & David
A. Kravitz, How Effective Are the Cross-Examination and Expert Testimony Safeguards?
Jurors' Perceptions of the Suggestiveness and Fairness of Biased Lineup Procedures, 87 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1042, 1042 (2002); see also GARRETT, supra note 63, at 79.
240. See Richard S. Schmechel, Timothy P. O'Toole, Catharine Easterly &
Elizabeth F. Loftus, Beyond the Ken? Testing jurors' Understanding of Eyewitness
Reliability Evidence, 46JURIMETRICSJ. 177, 177-205 (2006); Carolyn Semmler, Neil
Brewer & Amy Bradfield Douglass, Jurors Believe Eyewitnesses, in AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL
Ass'N, CoNvIcTION OF THE INNOCENT: LESSONS FROM PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH 185,
185-86 (Brian L. Cutler ed., 2012). For a discussion on expert testimony on
eyewitness scientific principles, see Saul M. Kassin, V. Anne Tubb, Harmon M.
Hosch & Amina Memon, On the "General Acceptance" of Eyewitness Testimony Research:
A New Survey of the Experts, 56 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 405 (2001).
241. Devenport, Stinson, Cutler & Kravitz, supra note 239, at 1052-53.
242. Daniel B. Wright, Marianna E. Carlucci, Jacqueline R. Evans & Nadja
Schreiber Compo, Turning a Blind Eye to Double Blind Line-Ups, 23 APPLIED
COGNrrIVE PSYCHOL. 1, 1 (2009),
243. See id. at 15.
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misperceptions through courtroom methods of expert testimony
and jury instructions.
A troubling fact is that even eyewitnesses themselves are
relatively insensitive to the quality of encoding conditions under
which they formed a memory of an offender or of the impact of
police procedures on their identification decisions.24 5 Eyewitness
scientists play an important role in helping legal decision makers
assess eyewitness credibility. Video-recording of the witness's
identification attempt may be helpful to juror assessment of
eyewitness accuracy. Legal remedies for eyewitness issues include
reconsideration of Manson criteria, suppression of identification
evidence, motions in limine to limit testimony (e.g., on
confidence), judicial instructions, and expert testimony. The
recent report on eyewitness evidence by the National Academy of
Sciences echoed many of these recommendations, urging
increased court use of pretrial judicial inquiry, expert witnesses,
and jury instructions to convey scientific information relevant to
eyewitness memory.21s The report also recommended that juries be
made aware of out-of-court identifications of the suspect by the
witness, the manner and timeframe in which they were conducted,
249and the confidence level expressed by the eyewitness at the time.
These are very positive steps forward.
VII. CONCLUSION
Eyewitness fallibility has been a perennial problem for the
justice system. Eyewitness science now offers recommendations for
best practices in the collection of eyewitness evidence, as a means
to reduce the likelihood of eyewitness error. Minnesota
244. Id. at 15-16.
245. See generally R. C. L. Lindsay, Carolyn Semmler, Nathan Weber, Neil
Brewer & Marilyn R. Lindsay, How Variations in Distance Affect Eyewitness Reports and
Identification Accuracy, 32 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 526 (2008) (discussing eyewitnesses
being insensitive to the effect of distance on memory); Wells & Bradfield, supra
note 167, at S37-38 (discussing structural bias in lineups).
246. Margaret C. Reardon & Ronald P. Fisher, Effect of Viewing the Interview and
Identification Process on Juror Perceptions of Eyewitness Accuracy, 25 APPLIED COGNITIVE
PSYCHOL. 68, 69-70 (2011).
247. For a broader discussion of these legal remedies, see Smalarz & Wells,
supra note 82, at 21.
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jurisdictions have been at the forefront of implementing these best
practices, specifically in the use of the double-blind sequential
procedure.
The blind sequential procedure facilitates two
important behaviors relevant to the acquisition of the best
possible information: the witness's independentjudgment
about each photo based on memory alone, and the
investigator's objective documentation of those
judgments. Thus, sequential procedures are more likely
than traditional lineups to reveal what witnesses really
remember and are trying to convey. This in turn allows
attorneys, judges, and juries to be more confident when
identifications are made and to appreciate the
significance of conditional identifications.
Put another way, blind sequential procedures give us a
clearer view of the truth."'
Across the country, jurisdictions that have mandated or
recommended revised procedures include some entire states (New
Jersey, North Carolina, Connecticut, Georgia, Oregon, Virginia,
Texas, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin), as well as individual
jurisdictions (e.g., Dallas; Boston; Philadelphia; Denver; San
Francisco; Tucson; Northampton, Massachusetts; and Santa Clara,
California) .25' The Innocence Project keeps up-to-date listings of
jurisdictional reforms.252 The International Association of Chiefs of
Police has endorsed recommended identification procedures
including sequential double-blind lineups.
253
Nevertheless, a recent survey of law enforcement found only a
minority of jurisdictions fully using these best practices. 25' A survey
of 532 U.S. law enforcement officers found that very few had
255knowledge of eyewitness factors or of how memory works.
250. Klobuchar, Steblay & Caligiuri, supra note 3, at 410-11.




253. INT'L ASS'N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, NATIONAL SUMMIT ON WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS: BUILDING A SYSTEMIC APPROACH TO PREVENT WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
14 (2013), available at http://www.theiacp.org/portals/O/documents/pdfs
/WrongfulConvictionsSummitReportWEB.pdf.
254. POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 66, at xiii.
255. See Wise, Safer & Maro, supra note 95, at 488.
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Education and training are necessary components for change, a
point recognized by the National Academy of Sciences in its
recommendations for increasing the value of eyewitness
evidence. 56
The recent AJS study of lineup performance with real
eyewitnesses presents a sobering statistic. Even with the best-
recommended practices (double-blind sequential procedure),
thirty-one percent of witnesses who made positive identifications
chose filler picks (known errors).2 57 Thus, there is much room for
improvement. It is useful to step back and take a long view of the
interview and identification processes of the broader police
investigation. For example: How did this suspect get in the lineup
to begin with? How did the case detective decide how the
investigation should proceed with this identification evidence? Up
to forty percent of officers report that they would place a suspect in
a lineup with no evidence of guilt but by simply playing a hunch,
25
8
an unwritten policy with direct implications for the rate of culprit-
absent lineups in the field and inherent risks for innocent
suspects. 59 We have very little information about how investigators
respond to non-identifications, to contradictory eyewitness
evidence, or to witness qualifiers of an identification, and whether
evidentiary standards influence detective decisions and eyewitness
decisions.
The central importance of eyewitness memory evidence in the
legal system, and its substantial weight and significant
consequences in criminal convictions and monetary awards, means
that eyewitness science must be an informed and informing partner
to law. Scientific evaluation of legal assumptions about the
strengths and limitations of human memory remains essential, as
do continued advances in empirically-based remedies to protect
witness memory from disruption and contamination.
256. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L AcADS., supra note 6.
257. See supra text accompanying note 206.
258. Wise, Safer & Maro, supra note 95, at 497.
259. Wells, supra note 140, at 636-37.
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